

**Greasing the Axles of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Resolving the Issue of the Sheba'a Farms**

Nathaniel Markowitz

Abstract

*The United States should support the transfer of the Sheba'a farms to Lebanese sovereignty independently of larger regional initiatives. Specifically, Washington should not predicate this transfer on the disarmament of Hizbullah or progress on Syrian-Israeli peace. This is an opportunity both to test Syria's sincerity in its stated desire for improved relations with Washington and to remove one of Hizbullah's most powerful rhetorical tools. At the same time, both the U.S. and Israel stand to lose very little, even if they failed to realize the proposed transfer.*

*International Journal for Arab Studies*  
VOL. 1, NO. 1, APRIL 2010

© 2010 SAIS & IJAS - ISSN 2044-138X

---

## **Preliminary Remarks**

In the Middle East, unresolved issues are never forgotten. Rather, they lie dormant until an interested party finds a political use for them. Such is the case of the Sheba'a farms, a small tract of land approximately 22 km<sup>2</sup> located on the southern border of Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan heights. This small piece of property, lacking any strategic value or natural resources became politically useful following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. It became the primary justification for Hizbullah's continued conflict with Israel. They maintained that the UN certification (UNSC1 2000) of Israel's complete withdrawal was illegitimate due to Israel's continued occupation of the Sheba'a farms, which they maintain is Lebanese territory. Despite the relatively small scale (geographically) of this issue, it represents a strategic opportunity for the United States to breathe new life into what is an otherwise stagnant peace process. The international community must not allow it to slip away, like so many other opportunities for peace in the Middle East.

This memo analyzes the problems surrounding the farms and presents options for American policy-makers. It is divided into four sections. The first section defines the problem in terms of the current conflict and the historical context in which it is situated. The second presents several possible ways to proceed. This is followed by a recommendation determined by the net results of applying three criteria to each option. They are 1) the likelihood of implementation, 2) the degree to which successful implementation advances American interests and 3) the costs, both political and material, associated with such implementation. The third section specifies concrete actions necessary for the implement of the recommended policy. The fourth section concludes with some thoughts on the peace process and its future.

### **I. French Indifference, Arab Politics: The Makings of a Problem**

Many believe that the conflict over the Sheba'a farms was manufactured by Hizbullah as a pretext for continuing its war with Israel. While there is no doubt that Hizbullah has attempted to maximize its political value, the historical record indicates that this has been a problem for

quite a while. In fact, as far back as the 1930's, the French<sup>i</sup> acknowledged that there was ambiguity over the demarcation of borders between Syria and Lebanon, particularly in terms of the Sheba'a farms, though they did nothing about it (Kaufman 2002, 580).

There is a lot of contradictory evidence regarding who should have sovereignty over the Sheba'a farms. The Lebanese government recently submitted a variety of information, including maps, property deeds and reports to the UN supporting its claim (UNSG 2006). Many other maps, however, show the farms clearly within Syrian boundaries. But Asher Kaufman, an expert on the issue, points out that these maps, not made by professional cartographers, were rather vague. And the few professional maps that were produced did not cover the Sheba'a farms. Thus, the conclusions drawn from these maps pertaining to the technical task of border demarcation are approximations at best (Kaufman 2002, 580). Moreover, a UN report confirms this ambiguity, stating that "there seems to be no official record of an international boundary agreement between Lebanon and Syria that could easily establish the line for purposes of confirming the withdrawal (UNSC2 2000)."

What is clear, however, is that the de facto border<sup>ii</sup> was not taken into consideration when the official border was determined. As such, they do not coincide. There is substantial evidence that many French officials working in the area and the inhabitants themselves viewed the farms as Lebanese, despite the official borders (Kaufman 2002, 585-586). This inconsistency stemmed largely from French indifference to identification of borders within its mandate, a marked contrast to its meticulous border demarcation with neighboring territories such as Palestine and Turkey (*ibid.* 581).

The problem persisted after the French withdrawal, due largely to the politics of the Arab world at the time. Damascus insisted that Lebanon was part of Syria and Beirut had much larger problems to deal with than a small stretch of land along its frontier (*ibid.* 593). Yet despite this, the Lebanese people continued to treat the land as their own. It was not until Israel's 1967 occupation of the Golan Heights that the Lebanese' access to the land was restricted.

Other events in the Middle East—Syria's occupation of Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, peace between Israel and Egypt and Israel's invasion of Lebanon, to name a few—

relegated the issue of the Sheba'a farms to the back burner. It was only after Israel's 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon that the issue regained prominence.

The Israeli position is that "there is no question that the Sheba'a farms area is recognized by the international community as not part of Lebanon. The status of these territories can ultimately be finalized in direct peace negotiations between Israel and Syria (IMFA 2002)." Lebanon has proposed placing the farms in the custody of the UN until Lebanese and Syrian officials can delineate the border (Siniora 2006). According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Syria agreed to accept this proposal (Bathish 2007). Indeed, the UN has stated that "concerning the Sheba'a farmlands, both Lebanon and Syria state that this land belongs to Lebanon (UNSC 2000)." And as already noted, Hizbullah continues to use Israeli occupation of the farms as a justification for continued conflict.

## **II. Getting to Yes: Effective American Policy Toward the Farms**

Three alternatives present themselves as viable approaches for U.S. policy-makers. First, Washington could insist that any transfer of the Sheba'a farms be linked to the disarmament of Hizbullah. Second, it could insist that the transfer be a first step in the Israel-Syrian peace process. Third, it could decouple this issue from any larger regional initiatives and pursue resolution of this problem as an end worthy in and of itself, which this memo recommends.

The first alternative is appealing for a variety of reasons. For one thing, the disarmament of Hizbullah is one of America's top priorities in the Middle East. Moreover, many believe that relinquishing the Sheba'a farms without requiring Hizbullah's disarmament would in effect be "caving to terrorism." In fact, then PM Olmert echoed this sentiment when it was first proposed that the farms be turned over to UN jurisdiction (Benn 2007). It also has the added appeal of disentangling this issue from the pitfalls of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations—an issue that, given Syria's support for Beirut's sovereignty over the farms, is fundamentally Lebanese.

These great benefits are offset by great costs, however. For one thing, this would require the establishment of some sort of verification process confirming Hizbullah's disarmament. This always represents a problem, both politically and economically. For one thing, despite its

rhetoric, it is unlikely that Hizbullah will voluntarily disarm even if the farms are ceded to Lebanon. This would necessitate forceful disarmament. However, it is unclear whether the Lebanese government is capable of accomplishing this (ICG 2009, 16 fn. 111). Middle East expert Paul Salem highlighted this dilemma when he stated that “although the government . . . had decision-making power, and the opposition [Hizbullah] did not have veto power—in effect the government was unable to implement decisions it had taken when they related to Hizbollah (CEIP 2008).”

This would entail an American commitment of troops to ensure successful implementation. This is unlikely for three reasons. First, the American military is already stretched thin between two wars and its other commitments around the world. Second, the Lebanese government is unlikely to invite U.S. troops back onto its soil. The political backlash for such an action would likely sound the death knell for the March 14 coalition<sup>iii</sup>. Finally, based on the military’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unlikely that American troops, even if they were sent, could successfully disarm Hizbullah. Thus, the likelihood of this option being implemented is low.

The second option, linking the Sheba’a farms issue to Israeli-Syrian peace, also pursues a strategically important goal for the United States. While this would not advance American interests as much as disarming Hizbullah, many view such a treaty as an important intermediary step toward such an end (ICG 2005, 37). According to a Syrian official close to President Assad, “we want the Golan and will not surrender on that. Hizbullah is our best card to guarantee our interests. . . . It is our trump card to pressure Israel. We don’t have a credible army or the technology we need to fight or resist anyone! Yet Syria is the only regional country that can control Hizbullah (ICG 2004, 14 fn. 91).” Thus, peace between the two countries could very well result in a treaty with Lebanon as well (ICG 2002, 16). At the very least, it would fundamentally alter the strategic calculus both in the region and within Lebanon itself.

Relinquishing the farms would most likely be an initial confidence building measure once a treaty was signed. The International Crisis Group (ICG)<sup>iv</sup> highlighted the value of such a step, when it stated that “in the wake of a long hiatus in bilateral relations—a feature of [former French] President Chirac’s and [former] President Bush’s tenures—both sides likely will require a significant period of mutual observation and trust-building. Quick results, in other words,

ought not to be anticipated. Next, any successful relationship must be based on clear and steady objectives rather than an endless list of demands (ICG 2009, 1).” This option would fulfill both criteria—trust-building and pursuing “clear and steady objectives.”

There are, however, problems with this approach as well. If American policy-makers decided to use this issue as a catalyst to push forward a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty, it might turn out to be counterproductive. They would risk elevating an issue that has been relatively non-controversial in terms of Israeli-Syrian negotiations to a point of major contention. Additionally, if the Israelis make peace with the Syrians, they will no doubt end up fully withdrawing from the Golan Heights—the Syrian “bottom line” for negotiations (Hof 2009, 1). If this happens, the issue of Sheba’a will most likely recede back into the shadows. This would mean missing a valuable opportunity for constructive American engagement in the region—at least for as long as negotiations between Israel and Syria remain stalled.

Moreover, the politics of the conflict over the Sheba’a farms is rather straightforward. This is in stark contrast to the murky politics surrounding the Israeli-Syrian conflict and negotiations. Thus, not only does this proposal risk undermining negotiations between Israel and Damascus, it also risks complicating a (relatively) simple issue.

Despite these concerns, successfully implementing this alternative seems more likely than the first. There is a good chance that Syria would accept this if it were accompanied by a promise of improved bilateral ties with Washington. The question, however, is not whether Syria would agree. Rather, it is whether Israel will agree. In the last serious round of negotiations<sup>v</sup>, according to U.S. participants, “the Syrians showed unusual flexibility on a number of issues, including security arrangements and ‘normal, peaceful relations.’ However, it quickly became apparent that Barak had not come to conclude an agreement (ICG 2004, 1).” This was attributed to recent polls in Israel showing that full withdrawal from the Golan was very unpopular.

Given the resurgence of the conservatives in Israel at the moment, it is unlikely that such a withdrawal will be much more popular than it was 10 years ago. It would thus require quite a bit of pressure from Washington to get this policy accepted, which would require a lot of

political capital. So, while this alternative does seem more likely to succeed than that presented above, it would advance Washington's interests less and it would still require considerable costs.

The third alternative proposes to decouple the resolution of the problems over the Sheba'a farms from any larger regional initiatives. Of course, the benefits from this will be less than for the previous two options, but they are still considerable. First and foremost, it would remove one of Hizbullah's most used and most effective rhetorical weapons. It is likely that they will try to find a new pretext for continued resistance, but this would no doubt undermine their credibility both at home and abroad. As one Shi'ite cleric in Beirut put it, "if the Israelis were to move out of the Sheba'a, that would be the end of the resistance. Any Shiite, any Lebanese, will accept that. What options will Hizbollah have left? It could either cease its operations or insist on the liberation of Jerusalem. I don't think they will enjoy much popular support for the latter. It is not our responsibility. I would openly speak out and say so (ICG 2005, 25)."

Furthermore, it would be an opportunity for Washington to lay the foundations for improved relationships in the Arab world. America is often viewed as completely pro-Israeli and completely anti-Arab. Championing an Arab cause without the laundry list of demands that usually accompanies Washington's approach to the region would help undermine that claim. It would also be an invaluable, low-risk opportunity to test the sincerity of Syria's claims that they are willing to be a responsible partner in improved bilateral relations with the United States. Finally, it allows Israel to make a good-faith gesture to the Arab world without much risk.

While the attendant benefits of this alternative are lower, so are the costs. Perhaps the most significant cost is that the U.S. and Israel would give up a bargaining chip for very little if anything in return. Additionally, some will view this, as already noted, as "caving to terrorism." Furthermore, the official position of Israel is that they will "solve the problem as part of an overall agreement on the Golan Heights (Benn 2007)." While this position is consistent with the second alternative above, it represents a potential problem for this approach. However, the political costs of pressuring Israel to compromise over the farms are much lower than over a comprehensive peace with Syria.

Of all the alternatives, the third has the highest likelihood of implementation. For one thing, it involves the least amount of compromise on all sides. It also requires the least amount

of political capital from Washington. Moreover, much of the work has been done already. One of the UN cartographers was allowed into the farms on 5 September, 2006. He delineated concrete borders during his visit, though the question of sovereignty over the demarcated territory was not addressed (UNSG 2006, para. 58). Finally, while Israel's cooperation is needed for implementation, the ultimate responsibility lies with Beirut and Damascus, who both attest that the farms are Lebanese.

Given the above considerations, Washington should decouple the question of the Sheba'a farms from wider regional initiatives. The incredibly high costs combined with the low likelihood of implementation make the first alternative unviable. Indeed, the disarmament of Hizbullah is most likely to come after progress on the peace process has been made, not as a precondition for renewing that process.

The second option is appealing, particularly given how close the Israelis and Syrians seem to be (or at least, have been) to making peace<sup>vi</sup>. However, this sanguine view can be misleading. If anything, the length of time that the process has been stalled belies the apparent closeness of an agreement. From that perspective, linking the problem of the Sheba'a farms to a larger treaty would likely serve to defer its resolution rather than help realize peace between Syria and Israel. And if indeed the two countries are close to reaching peace, then it would be counterproductive to introduce an issue to the spotlight that heretofore has not been problematic.

On the other hand, the low costs and relatively high likelihood of success of the last option positions it as an excellent first step in repairing Washington's and Israel's relationships with the Arab world. Indeed, even the failure of this policy carries a sort of consolation prize. The West would gain a deeper insight into the true motives and interests of Damascus, Beirut and Hizbullah while risking comparatively little.

### **III. Translating Words into Actions, Policies into Perspectives**

No policy recommendation would be complete without discussing the necessary steps for its implementation. In this case, implementation involves two things. First, there are certain steps that each side must take to realize the goals of this policy once it has been adopted.

Second, Washington must take the initiative to define the public discourse over this policy in order to create the political space needed for these steps to be taken.

There are several specific, tangible actions that must be taken to implement the recommended policy. First, Washington must secure Israel's consent to allow Syrian and Lebanese officials into the Sheba'a farms to address the details of the border. Border issues will most likely be resolved in cooperation with the UN cartographer, who has pledged his support for such an action (*ibid.* para. 79). Second, Israel must agree to withdraw in a timely manner from any territory that, in the final determination, is deemed Lebanese.

This must be paired with an explicit commitment from both Beirut and Damascus to determine speedily their respective borders, once Israeli consent has been given for their officials to enter. In fact, President Assad, in a 2006 speech, asserted that Syria is ready to demarcate the borders. He has stated that the only requirements for moving forward on this are formally registering the complaint with the UN and allowing access to Syrian and Lebanese officials so they can address the technical aspects of border determination (Assad 2006). The latter condition has been addressed above; the former is little more than a technicality, easily met. This process will likely be expedited by the work of the UN cartographer.

Finally, Washington must exert subtle but persistent pressure on all sides to move this process forward. It must not fall into the trap of adopting what seems to be a reasonable policy and then moving on. Very little progress toward the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East occurs absent U.S. leadership.

The other critical aspect of implementation is how the policy is framed in the public discourse. There will be those who wish to characterize it as "caving to terrorism," anti-Israel and showing weakness. Unless the positive outcomes and low costs of such a policy are emphasized to the public, this negative rhetoric could torpedo such an initiative.

From the perspective of Israel, it should be highlighted that it is not, in fact, conceding anything. Rather, cooperating in this endeavor is entirely consistent with its twin policies of full withdrawal from Lebanon and continued occupation of the Golan Heights. If the Syrians wish to cede territory to Lebanon, that is not Israel's business. Any adjustments to the lines of occupation would merely be motivated by its commitment to those two policies.

Next, there is the Lebanese perspective. Observing Washington's cautious shift towards engagement with Syria combined with U.S. encouragement of the Israeli-Syrian track, Beirut has expressed concern that the United States will sacrifice Lebanese sovereignty in order to achieve its goal of shifting Syria's strategic posture. This policy must be framed as an example of Washington's commitment to protecting and promoting Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanon is the first Arab democracy and, as such, is vitally important to American strategic interests in the Middle East.

In terms of Syria, this is the perfect opportunity to test the sincerity of its stated desire to improve relations with the West. As has already been noted, Damascus has consistently emphasized improved relations with Washington as a necessary component of progress on a deal with Israeli. Syria's cooperation or lack thereof on an issue such as this will be much more useful in assessing their intentions than high level meetings or speeches.

Finally, the question of caving to terrorism must be addressed. This criticism is legitimate only if the West and Israel expect that making such a concession will fundamentally alter Hizbullah's posture. While its voluntary disarmament would certainly be welcomed, it is unlikely that anyone really expects this to happen. Rather, Hizbullah will probably fabricate another issue to justify their continued fighting. Thus, the issue of terrorism is largely irrelevant to this policy because Washington would not have the expectation of changed behavior. Rather, it is motivated by the desire to promote Lebanese sovereignty and lay the groundwork for a more positive relationship with Beirut, Damascus and the wider Arab world. Hizbullah may have screamed the loudest about the Sheba'a farms, but their relevance to the calculus of decision-making in this respect is minimal. In fact, they are relevant only insofar as this policy will likely undermine their credibility.

#### **IV. Looking Forward, Looking Backward**

Most people believe that the Arab-Israeli peace process has been stalled since President Bush assumed office in 2001. In fact, very little real progress has been made since 1994, when Israel and Jordan signed their peace treaty. The hope that the Oslo process would lead to Israeli-Palestinian peace has been dispelled by the broken bodies of men, women and children on both sides. While some progress has been made on the Syrian front, this is small consolation in

comparison with the opportunities that have been missed. The events of September 11, 2001, followed by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, largely removed the words “Arab-Israeli peace” from the popular vocabulary for several years.

If the initiatives of the last several decades have largely been dead ends, a novel approach must be adopted to reinvigorate this process. Successfully resolving the problem over the Sheba’a farms might very well mean unraveling the first knot in the tangled skein that is the conflict in the Middle East. Though decoupling the Sheba’a farms from larger regional initiatives and pursuing its resolution as a worthwhile end in itself is the most reasonable approach, that is not to say that it will be easy. It will not be. But through perseverance, determination and courage, perhaps Washington and the international community can indeed grease the axles of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

---

**Endnote**

<sup>i</sup> After World War I, France was given mandatory (occupying) power over what is now Syria and Lebanon. It withdrew from Lebanon in 1945 and from Syria in 1946

<sup>ii</sup> The term “de facto border” refers to the perceptions, actions and movement of the inhabitants of an area in terms of the location of borders.

<sup>iii</sup> The March 14 coalition is a bloc of anti-Syrian political parties that currently holds a majority in the Lebanese parliament.

<sup>iv</sup> ICG is an NGO committed to monitoring and analyzing the various ongoing conflicts in the world.

<sup>v</sup> This was in 2000, when former President Clinton hosted talks between the late President Hafez Assad and former Prime Minister Ehud Barak.

<sup>vi</sup> The only real point of contention is control over a small strip of land on the northeastern edge of the Sea of Galilee which is based on concerns over water rights. Issues such as security and normalization were largely settled in 2000.

### **Bibliography**

Assad, Bashar. Speech before the annual convention of the Arab Lawyers Union, Damascus. English translation by SANA, the official Syrian state news agency, January 21, 2006.

<http://www.cggl.org/scripts/document.asp?id=46253>

Bathish, Hani. "Ban cites Hizbullah's arms as 'key' threat to government's authority," *The Daily Star*, May 9, 2007.

[http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition\\_id=1&categ\\_id=2&article\\_id=82088](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=82088)

Benn, Aluf. "UN cartographer to plot Shaba Farms border boundaries," *Haaretz*, September 7, 2007. <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/901363.html>

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP). Syrian/Israeli Peace Talks and Political Deal in Lebanon: Teleconference with Carnegie Experts (Marina Ottaway, director, Carnegie Middle East Program and Paul Salem, director, Carnegie Middle East Center (Beirut). May 21, 2008. [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0521\\_transcript\\_lebanon\\_syriaisrael.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0521_transcript_lebanon_syriaisrael.pdf)

Hof, Frederic C. "Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel," United States Institute for Peace, 2009,. <http://www.usip.org/resources/mapping-peace-between-syria-and-israel>

International Crisis Group (ICG). *Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities*, Middle East Report No. 83, February 11, 2009.

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle\\_east\\_\\_\\_north\\_africa/arab\\_israeli\\_conflict/syria/83\\_engaging\\_syria\\_\\_\\_u.s.\\_constraints\\_and\\_opportunities.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/syria/83_engaging_syria___u.s._constraints_and_opportunities.pdf)

International Crisis Group (ICG). *Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria*, Middle East Report No. 39, April 12, 2005.

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle\\_east\\_\\_\\_north\\_africa/arab\\_israeli\\_conflict/lebanon/39\\_syria\\_after\\_lebanon\\_\\_\\_lebanon\\_after\\_syria.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/lebanon/39_syria_after_lebanon___lebanon_after_syria.pdf)

International Crisis Group (ICG). *Syria Under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges*, Middle East Report No. 23, February 11, 2004.

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle\\_east\\_\\_\\_north\\_africa/arab\\_israeli\\_conflict/syria/23\\_syria\\_1\\_foreign\\_policy\\_challenges.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/syria/23_syria_1_foreign_policy_challenges.pdf)

International Crisis Group (ICG). *Middle East Endgame III: Israel, Syria, Lebanon—How Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look*, Middle East Report No. 4, July 16, 2002.

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle\\_east\\_\\_\\_north\\_africa/arab\\_israeli\\_conflict/syria/24\\_syria\\_2\\_domestic\\_policy\\_challenge.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/syria/24_syria_2_domestic_policy_challenge.pdf)

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA). *The Legal Status of the Sheba'a Farms*. April 8, 2002.

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/about%20the%20ministry/mfa%20spokesman/2002/the%20legal%20status%20of%20the%20shabaa%20farms%20-%208-apr-2002>

Kaufman, Asher. "Who Owns the Shebaa Farms? Chronicle of a Territorial Dispute," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Autumn, 2002, pp. 576-595.

Siniora, Fouad. *The Lebanese Seven-Point Plan*. August 3, 2006.

[news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/5256936.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5256936.stm)

United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG). *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701, Annex*, 2006. [www.spot-on.com/allbritton/UN-Report-on-Implementation-of-1701-Oct-31.pdf](http://www.spot-on.com/allbritton/UN-Report-on-Implementation-of-1701-Oct-31.pdf)

United Nations Security Council (UNSC1). *Security Council Endorses Secretary-General's Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal From Lebanon as of June 16*, Press Release SC/6878, 2000.

[www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html)

United Nations Security Council (UNSC2). UN Security Council, S/2000/460, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), 2000.

<http://domino.un.org/unispal.NSF/2ee9468747556b2d85256cf60060d2a6/97bad2289146f58a852852e9006d99bd?OpenDocument>